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I. INTRODUCTION
In Industrial Relations in Transition: The Paper Industry Example,' Jack
Getman and Ray Marshall contend that employers should follow a high-
performance, as opposed to a low-wage, strategy. They try to justify this
contention by comparing the labor relations experience of International Paper
(IP) with that of other paper industry firms, which have viable unions. In order
to have a high-performance strategy, they argue, a firm must have a union with
enough power to protect the worker. They claim that our labor laws and the
courts that administer them are destroying, not promoting, unionization. They
conclude that policymakers ought to change these labor laws-including,
among others, the legal rule allowing firms to hire permanent replacements for
striking workers.
Getman and Marshall begin with the story of IP. I will begin by retelling
that story, omitting much of the detail, but retaining the gist of the facts in
Getman and Marshall's account. I argue that the political agenda that
permeates their article, as well as the methodology that they employ,
undermines the credibility of their conclusions and the persuasiveness of their
proposal for labor law reform.
I. THE STORY RETOLD
In the 1980's, as a result of changing economic climates in the United
States and abroad, and due to technical innovations, managers of IP began a
program to lower labor costs and thereby make the company more profitable.
An important step in this program was to persuade the union representing the
IP workers to agree to adjust wages to reflect the changed conditions and to
relax restrictive union work rules that prevented new technology from being
used effectively.' IP managers sought to enlist employee support through joint
manager-worker meetings and committees. But because this would lead to a
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reduced role for union leaders, and presumably a loss of esteem for them, the
leaders persuaded workers that the company efforts were not well-intentioned.
The union's reluctance to cooperate was illustrated by an incident that
signalled to managers that it would take a major effort to put IP employment
on the right track. Top-level managers decided that they could begin to
improve productivity and profitability by conducting a study of how the
workplace was, in fact, presently organized. Employees were asked to
cooperate by writing training manuals that would describe precisely the
components of their jobs. While managers could have brought in outsiders to
observe what employees did, a better (cheaper) approach was to ask the
employees themselves. Union leaders, however, directed the employees not to
write the manuals, on the ground that keeping the details of the production
processes secret from managers, if the workers could do so, would make future
strikes more likely to succeed.
Despite such union intransigence, IP managers made another effort to
secure changes by enlisting employee cooperation, this time through collective
bargaining. What managers wanted most was to eliminate work rules limiting
the tasks a particular worker would do to those described in her narrow job
classification. If a maintenance mechanic had no maintenance work to do, for
example, these work rules prohibited assigning her temporary clean-up duties.
The union rejected out of hand the "team concept" proposal, contending that
it would create safety dangers. In fact, the union rejected the proposal because
it might allow the plant to produce the same output with fewer workers.
Fearing a union strike, IP managers prepared by contacting a firm known for
its ability to secure replacements for strikers.
IP strategized that it had to modernize the work force throughout the
company's North American operations. The company's goals were clear.
Managers intended to emerge from a strike, if it came, with increased authority
to direct the work force, reduce the number of employees and lower labor
costs. After failing to accomplish these things by enlisting the support of
current workers and their union, managers determined to take the steps
necessary to accomplish them without the union's consent. Urged by local
union leaders to reject the company's proposed bargaining agreement, IP
workers struck. It was a big mistake for the workers and for their union.
Unions win strikes for a number of reasons. Sometimes they win strikes
by employing secondary boycotts, acts of violence, or intimidation. They can
win by getting government to exert pressure on managers. Unions can also
successfully use publicity campaigns against managers of the struck company,
their suppliers, and customers. But most importantly, a union can win a strike
if the workers possess skills and knowledge that are specific to the firm or the
industry, so that managers cannot replace them with newcomers, at least in the
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short run.3 The IP strikers lacked these specific skills and it cost them their
jobs.
The paperworkers union in Getman and Marshall's case study did not
succeed in enlisting effective support from government-in this case, from the
town of Jay, Maine--when two antistrike replacement housing ordinances were
struck down in court.4 The union also failed to succeed in its publicity
campaign. (The authors do not say why the union failed, only that Jay
residents won't drink Coca-Cola.)5 Jobs vacated by union members were filled
by replacement workers. The union sought to bring pressure against the
managers by extending the effect of the strike to other, unionized company
locations. It did this by persuading local unions not to accept a bargaining
agreement with IP until they all did. However, local union defections doomed
this pooling arrangement. Union leaders decided to end the strike, announcing
that union members would unconditionally return to work, but it was too late.
Most strikers had been permanently replaced. Shortly thereafter, the union was
decertified.
Among the IP workers, there are winners and losers. The winners include
replacement workers (and their families), who but for the strike would not
have found employment at IP. They were willing to work under terms rejected
by union members. The losers include strikers who could not find new
employment that they found as satisfying as their jobs at I.
There continues to be animosity between strikers and replacements at IP.
There always is where jobs are at stake. Whether the management ideas for
improving employee productivity at IP will be successful remains to be seen.
There is no data, and it may be too early to know. But even if labor
productivity never improves at the Jay IP plant, IP managers still count the
effort a success because of its effect companywide. Workers in other IP plants
have seen what may happen if they are inflexible in the face of changed
economic needs.
3. Other things being equal, the more competitive the labor market, the greater the likelihood that a
firm will be able to replace striking workers. In a perfectly competitive labor market, a firm has an infinite
number of workers available to it at the market wage. A strike involving only the withdrawal of labor (i.e.,
not involving secondary boycotts, violence, or other tactics) will not succeed unless the strikers have skills
or knowledge that are specific to the firm or the industry. Thus, the extreme cases are either where strikers
have no firm-specific or industry-specific skills and can be instantly replaced, or where the skills are
irreplaceable. In the latter case, the firm must settle the strike or go out of business. (Note, however, that
all strikers are replaceable over the long run, as the replacement of the air traffic controllers demonstrated.
See Frank Swoboda, Clinton Eyes Lifting Ban on Members of PATCO, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1993, at Al3
(striking union members replaced and barred from all government employment)).
4. See Getman & Marshall, supra note 1, at 1834.
5. Id. at 1832.
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III. THE GETMAN AND MARSHALL APPROACH
My retelling of the IP story is consistent with the account offered by
Getman and Marshall. It puts a different spin on the events, however. Their
article is in the tradition of an industrial relations economics that has now
largely been replaced by microeconomic studies largely based on formal
models and mathematical evaluation of industry-wide or national data.6 Some
of the problems created by the old narrative studies of particular labor relations
environments (e.g., the "New York newspaper strike," the "Kentucky mine
workers negotiations") are that they make it difficult to separate the facts from
the preconceptions of the reporters, and tend to generalize from sets of very
limited data.
Getman and Marshall make no effort to put aside their political agenda in
recounting the events at IR7 Thus, striking workers are marked by "group
cohesiveness, loyalty, creativity, discipline, intelligence, and decency. ''8
Managers, by contrast, are seeking not to involve workers in finding new ways
to improve plant productivity, but "to increase managerial power" 9 and force
employees to work "with less protection against arbitrary managerial
authority."' This flaw permeates their observations.
A. The Approach
What is the Getman and Marshall agenda? Getman and Marshall give us
little information as to what a "high-performance strategy" entails. It seems to
favor a few highly-skilled, highly-paid workers over many low-skilled, low-
paid workers." The normative argument for this strategy is not specified, 12
6. See generally Gerard Debreu, The Mathematization of Economic Theory, 81 AM. ECON. REv. I
(1991) (detailing the rise of mathematical methodology in economics); see, e.g., 2 ORLEY ASHENFETTER
& RICHARD LAYARD, HANDBOOK OF LABOR ECONOMICS 1039-1268 (1986) (collection of articles about
unions and labor markets, each using formal modeling and mathematical analysis of data sets).
7. See Getman & Marshall, supra note 1, at 1871-72.
8. Id. at 1877-78.
9. Id. at 1817.
10. Id. at 1820.
11. The IP story does not help us to understand the features marking high-performance and low-wage
firms. We are given no pre-strike, post-strike wage rates, output figures, or other productivity measures.
For an example of how such a study can be conducted, see Kim B. Clark, The Impact of Unionization on
Productivity: A Case Study, 33 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 451 (1980). Using a fully specified
microeconomic model, Clark examined data from about 80% of the cement industry, compiled over many
years. These data included "tons of finished cement, hours of work, plant location, annual plant capacity,
and ... the age and capacity of individual kilns. The data on manhours are broken down by department,
permitting the construction of variables measuring production and supervisory or nonproduction labor input.
The supervisor category includes plant management, foremen and supervisors, clerical staff, and laboratory
personnel. The production category includes workers in the quarry, the raw grinding and finishing
departments, and the general labor group .... [I]nformation is available on the installation and 'practical'
capacity of individual kilns." Id. at 456. Using this data, and information about changes in work rules as
embodied in collective agreements, Clark explored the effect of unionization on employee productivity. A
critic of Clark's study could look for shortcomings in the data, or careless or distorted analysis of the data.
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nor is it obvious. High-performance strategies might be preferable because they
make firms more profitable and more competitive with foreign firms. But
Getman and Marshall never demonstrate this claim. They make vague
references to high-performance strategies in Europe and claim that comparing
IP to other paper companies yields some evidence of the greater profitability
of high-performance firms, but neither is adequately supported.13 A second
normative argument is that the welfare of workers is enhanced by a high-
performance strategy. This seems correct for talented, trained workers who end
up with high-performance jobs, but it ignores the lost employment
opportunities such a strategy entails. Which is preferable, a large restaurant
with a single highly paid worker running a computerized hamburger grill or
the same restaurant with 12 low-paid workers manually flipping the
hamburgers?
The authors address a second proposition more directly; they argue that
unions are necessary to protect workers. Nevertheless, it is difficult to capture
the essentials of this claim. First, note the war metaphors. A union is involved
in "many battles and a variety of theaters of operation."' 4 The IP strikers had
no "excessive zeal for combat."' 5 Using war metaphors makes the strike look
like something other than an attempt by incumbent workers to maintain wage
levels and restrictive work rules.
Second, Getman and Marshall make numerous references to inequality of
bargaining power between labor and management without defining such
inequality or showing that it exists. 6 Inequality of bargaining power between
managers (the power-holders) and the worker (the powerless) has been an
Clark also interviewed workers and managers. He writes, "It was apparent from [the interviews] that
retrospective interviews provide only weak evidence on the more subtle effects of unionization. Changes
in morale and motivation, differences in work group efficiency, and the amount of on-the-job training
appear to be difficult to assess without carefully designed questionnaires administered before and after
unionization and without measurement and observation of the process in question." Id. at 463.
The Getman and Marshall study does not provide the hard data (product output, labor costs, etc.,
before and after the strike) that would be necessary to evaluate their conclusions. Moreover, their interview
reports offer less information than needed by scholars who wish to build on their work. While the authors
report that they interviewed top management, they fail (with minor exceptions) to provide even a biased
account of the strike and the events leading up to it from the point of view of that management. See, e.g.,
Getman & Marshall, supra note I, at 1878 n.274.
12. Getman and Marshall merely conclude that a "high-performance strategy" is worth pursuing ("This
high-performance option ... is more compatible with our own country's national interest than the low-wage
alternative.") They do not specify their reasons. Getman & Marshall, supra note 1, at 1813 (citations
omitted).
13. Id. at 1810-11. The authors do not show that European firms are either more profitable or more
competitive than our own. The European economy is not prospering. And even if European firms are more
profitable, it may be in spite of unionization, not because of it. Nor do the authors attempt to measure the
productivity or profitability of IP, Otis, or Scott. Self-serving statements from workers are no substitute for
hard data. Even if those statements were treated as conclusive evidence of output per worker hour, it would
not support any conclusions without labor costs information.
14. Id. at 1825.
15. Id. at 1878.
16. See id. at 1866-69.
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axiom of many writers seeking to justify unionization. In fact, far from being
axiomatic, inequality of bargaining power is an empty slogan.
In another context, Robert Scott and I sought to puzzle through what
"inequality of bargaining power" might mean. Three features seem to mark
contexts where this phrase is used. First, a large company is on one end of the
bargain, while an individual is on the other end. Second, the company offers
a deal, but refuses to dicker over its terms. Third, but not invariably, the
company has some monopoly power in its market. 7
If this is what marks inequality of bargaining power, it is a trivial concept.
The features are present every time a consumer makes a trip to the grocery
store to buy a banana. Are all banana purchases at a Kroger store thus marked
by inequality of bargaining power, demanding a cartel of banana-buyers to
offset the power of Kroger's? If so, we need a lot of cartels, including, I
presume, cartels of stockholders, nonboardroom managers, and so forth.'8 It
is not clear by what measure IP's "resources" were greater than the union's.
Few unions have substantial investments in bricks and mortar, nor do unions
accumulate large strike funds. We could add up the personal assets of the
union's members, and compare it to IP's tangible assets, but what would be
the point of doing so? A firm can have a great many assets but still be in a
product market that makes it extremely vulnerable to a work stoppage.
Getman and Marshall argue that to attain a high-performance strategy, a
firm needs to guarantee to employees that they will not be treated arbitrarily
by management, and that such guarantees are inadequate without unions. t9
Neither claim is supported. Of course some managers act arbitrarily; no market
is perfect. The job of managers is to direct the operations of the firm for the
17. See ROBERT SCOTr & DOUGLAS LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 67 (1988).
18. A few economists have thought about whether there are widespread imperfections in the market
for employees that result in workers being paid less than their marginal revenue product. See Bruce E.
Kaufman, Labor's Inequality of Bargaining Power: Changes Over Tme and Implications for Public Policy
10 J. LAB. RES. 285 (1989) (arguing that employer domination of labor markets is no longer as pronounced
as it once was); Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor's Inequality of Bargaining Power: Myth or Reality?, 12 J. LAB.
RES. 151 (1991) (arguing that Labor does suffer from unequal bargaining power); Morgan 0. Reynolds,
The Myth of Labor's Inequality of Bargaining Power 12 J. LAB. RES. 167 (1991) (same). One imperfection
might be the presence of substantial firm-specific or industry-specific skills. This could be labeled
inequality of bargaining power in the sense that workers are paid less than they would be in a perfectly
competitive market.
If this is the meaning of the term as used by Getman and Marshall, they never mention it. Moreover,
there are powerful objections to the contention that strengthening unions can eliminate this kind of
bargaining inequality. All markets are imperfect, and there have been no studies demonstrating that labor
market imperfections are significant or that they work in favor of firms and against workers. Second, and
more important, a firm with market power would offer workers wages and benefits that are important to
workers-just like a monopolistic firm offers to purchasers products that appeal to the purchasers-but the
offer would be at a lower level. A monopolistic firm, like a competitive firm, would offer the mix of
wages, hours, and job security that workers preferred. Elsewhere, I have argued that markets may be
inadequate to control management "excesses," see Douglas L. Leslie, Labor Bargaining Units, 70 VA. L.
REV. 353, 371-74 (1984). Finally, the Getman and Marshall paper does not show the presence of substantial
firm-specific or industry-specific skills at International Paper, and the relative ease of replacing the strikers
suggests its absence.
19. See Getman & Marshall, supra note 1, at 1807, 1820.
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benefit of its owners. Managers have an incentive, as we all do, to slack-to
act in their own interests, rather that in the interest of the firm.2" It is a form
of slacking when managers reward their friends and punish their enemies in
the workplace. There are two constraints on this behavior: the market for
managers and the product market. Managers who slack are discharged by
owners and replaced by managers who do a better job. Firms that retain
managers who slack have a competitive disadvantage in the product market.
Neither the market for managers nor the product market works well enough to
oust all managers who slack or all firms with managers who slack. What
Getman and Marshall might be suggesting is that "friction costs" (i.e., the cost
of conflict between labor and management) are potentially higher in a high-
performance firm than in a low-wage firm due to management's need to tap
the skills and enthusiasm of workers in the high-performance setting." This
conclusion is not self-evident. One might argue, for example, that friction costs
are higher in a firm with unskilled, low-wage workers, as it would seem that
an unskilled lettuce picker is more likely to be mistreated by a supervisor (thus
creating friction) than a skilled IBM computer assembler.
Assuming that neither the market for managers nor the product market
fully eliminates management arbitrariness, the question is not whether these
markets work, but how well they work compared to alternative mechanisms.
Some would argue that the arbitrariness introduced by unions exceeds that of
managers in nonunion firms. If this were not the case, we might expect
unionized firms to outperform their nonunion competitors, over the long run
driving them from the market.22 Instead, union firms are disappearing. 3
20. This is how I would define "arbitrary."
21. Getman and Marshall may well be correct that the defeat of Local 14 would not have been
possible without IP's use of replacement workers. It does not follow that the success of a strike should not
turn on the firm's ability to secure replacement workers. Even if one accepts the premise that unionization
of workers is valuable to society generally and that collective bargaining is the best method for ensuring
compromise between workers and managers, there still will be strikes. Not even in the world of jointness
envisioned by Getman and Marshall will friction between labor and management be eliminated, and
miscalculations entirely avoided. So the question is what should determine the success of a strike for higher
wages.
I know of no answer. It is difficult to argue that the success of the strike should turn on whether
management's or the union's proposal is closer to the workers' just wage. The difficulties of such an
argument lie in theory and implementation. For example, if one adopts the neoclassical theory of wage
determination, there is no room for the labor-monopolizing union. Even if one thought that imperfections
in labor markets regularly resulted in depressed wages, measuring the marginal productivity of particular
workers is beyond the ability of current economic skills. Moreover, no union is required to limit its wage
demand to the rate that would pertain in a competitive market, even if that rate could be learned.
22. Richard Posner makes this argument, in the neoclassical tradition, with respect to job tenure. If
I were to substitute "jointness" for "job tenure," Posner's arguments might read something like this:
Although some empirical support has been marshaled for [the] productivity-enhancement
theory of unionization, the theory is extremely hard to accept. It is inconsistent with the
fundamental assumption of economics: that people, in this case employers, are rational profit
or utility maximizers. Although this assumption may not hold true in all settings, the behavior
of business employers towards their employees is one setting where it probably does. If granting
his employees Uointness] will increase their productivity, the rational employer will do so, for
this will reduce his costs of production. Even if the whole productivity gain is paid to the
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IV. THE RECOMMENDATIONS
By failing to support adequately either the proposition that high-
performance firms are more competitive and profitable or the proposition that
high-performance firms enhance worker welfare, Getman and Marshall
undermine their argument for legal reform. It is clear that a change in law
could revitalize unionization in the United States. Federal law could mandate
unions for workers. There would be implementation problems, and the law
would not be completely successful, but it would do much for unions. Getman
and Marshall, of course, do not go that far. Instead, they advocate a legislative
overruling of the Mackay strike-replacement case.24
Like a law mandating unionization, overruling Mackay would make unions
stronger. So would legalization of secondary boycotts, or relaxation of laws
against violence. But secondary boycotts and violence have more third-party
effects (i.e., injuries to bystanders and companies not involved in the dispute),
so overruling Mackay may be a preferred choice.
Without a strong argument as to the competitiveness or worker welfare
benefits ofjointness, Getman and Marshall's argument for overruling Mackay
effectively rests solely on the ground that union strikes ought to be more
effective. The authors write:
Our national labor law reflects an understanding of the importance
of balanced bargaining power in industrial relations. The framers of
that system assumed that the strike weapon would essentially equalize
bargaining power between employers and employees.... The paper
industry experience supports the general assumption of the NLRA's
drafters that by increasing union power and making it more nearly
equal to that of management, the law encourages mutual cooperation
and not economic strife. However, the paper industry experience also
employee in the form of a higher wage, the employer will be better off. He will have lower
total costs than his competitors and will therefore be able to expand his output relative to theirs
and increase his profits. Even if only a single employer in a competitive industry tumbled to
the advantages of granting [jointness], competition would force the others to follow suit.
Richard A. Posner, Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 1000-01 (1984). I am not
endorsing Posner's argument, but I do suggest that a proposal that the law encourage jointness must
respond to Posner's claim. A modest effort is found in Leslie, supra note 18. In that article, I used the
"collective voice" model to make some observations about how workers may be grouped for collective
bargaining.
23. The effect of unions on firm productivity and profitability has been the subject of a host of articles
by economists. Many of the sources are collected in John T. Addison and Barry T. Hirsch, Union Effects
on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run Arrived?, 7 J. LAB. ECON. 72 (1989). Productivity
is devilishly hard to measure, profitability less so. Unions reduce the profitability of firms. The
methodology of these articles, which to the mathematically ignorant often seems highly technical, relies
on data and formal models. The articles bear no similarity to the approach of Getman and Marshall.
24. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (holding that an employer
has "the right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is
not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume
their employment, in order to create places for them.").
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indicates that the balance of power has shifted. Employers are more
able to withstand strikes and unions are less able to utilize them
successfully. Yet the Board and the courts, which have uncritically
accepted a neoclassical concept of the role of unions, have become
more protective of employer economic pressure. Consequently,
employers like International Paper may be encouraged to pursue
concessions because they believe that they can crush union resistance
through tough bargaining and unilateral implementation together with
the threat of hiring permanent replacements in the event of a strike.
Further, employers may couple the threat of replacement with the
threat that the union will be decertified.'
The neoclassical model of trade unionism 6 is the prevailing model of
unions for economists,27 and it will take considerably more than a casual
potshot to replace it. In the neoclassical model, a union is a labor supply
monopolist that, when successful, increases the wages of unionized workers,
reduces the number of unionized workers, lowers the wages of workers in
nonunion firms, reduces the profitability of the firm, and imposes costs on
consumers. On the grounds that it takes a theory to beat a theory, especially
such a widely accepted model as the neoclassical model of unions, I think that
the largely unspecified high-wage/high-productivity model of Getman and
Marshall fails in the competitive market for models.28 If that is so, then their
case for the legislative overruling of Mackay fails as well.29
Getman and Marshall also argue for the legality of union voting pools. I
have no view on whether the device ought to be lawful, but I do not find the
arguments marshalled in its support persuasive. The authors report that "[i]t is
undisputed that the pool system did not affect which issues participating locals
discussed or how they conducted their negotiations., 30 That is not the
problem. Under the pool system, a union in Des Moines will not reach a
bargaining settlement until a union in Omaha also reaches a settlement. Of
course, the negotiations in Des Moines do not address issues on the table in
25. Getman & Marshall, supra note 1, at 1866 (citations omitted).
26. The model is described in nonformal terms in DOUGLAS LESLIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LABOR LAW 14-31 (3d ed. 1992).
27. See, e.g., RONALD EHRENBERG & ROBERT SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS 366-404 (2d ed.
1985).
28. For models that compete with the neoclassical model, see LESLIE, supra note 26, at 31-42 (3d ed.
1992) (describing internal labor market, relational contract, and collective goods models).
29. The best normative argument for the Mackay right to replace strikers, according to the neoclassical
model, is as follows: Wage rates are likely to be competitive where labor markets are competitive, but firm-
specific and industry-specific skills create bilateral monopoly problems that may depress wages below
market rates. Where managers can easily replace strikers, one can infer that both the market and the wage
rate are competitive. The fact that IP could replace the striking employees shows that the workers lacked
valuable firm-specific or industry-specific skills, and that their demands exceeded competitive market rates.
For a similar treatment of Mackay, see George M. Cohen & Michael L. Wachter, Replacing Striking
Wlbrkers: The Law and Economics Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY FORTY-THIRD
ANNUAL NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 109, at 117-18 (1990).
30. Getman & Marshall, supra note 1, at 1887.
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Omaha. From the Des Moines managers' standpoint it is worse than that: they
cannot bargain for an agreement because they have no control over the issues
separating the parties in Omaha.3'
V. CONCLUSION
Unions are going out of business.32 Is it the result of an inhospitable legal
climate? Getman and Marshall do not undertake to assay all the reasons for the
decline of unions. Nor shall I. It is likely that unions are failing for several
reasons, including press coverage that has, as long as I have studied unions,
emphasized the Dave Becks, Jimmy Hoffas, and Tony Boyles of the labor
movement. My impression is that managers, who used to think that union-
busting was in some vague moral sense wrong, no longer think so. Reagan's
notorious discharge of the air traffic controllers33 may have set this change
in motion. But the more significant cause may be the rhetoric and actions of
the union movement itself, with its emphasis on battle metaphors and the
acquisition of "power."
The challenge for Getman and Marshall is to present an account of why,
given the strengths they perceive of jointness programs and the value of the
cooperation offered by unions, managers do not get the message without an
exercise or holding of additional bargaining power by unions. Second, the
authors need to account for why the firms and managers that do not embrace
jointness are not driving their less enlightened competitors from the market. If
they offer no answers to these questions, Getman and Marshall should not be
writing an article calling for major legal reform, they should be presenting
seminars telling managers how they can earn more money for themselves and
their firms through jointness.
31. The same could not be said if the Des Moines local union instead extended the right to vote on
the ratification of the Des Moines agreement to Omaha union members. If only that happened, the Des
Moines managers would know what it would take for them to settle the dispute. There may be other
reasons to disallow a union the right to extend ratification privileges to nonunit members (although it is
common, I believe, for all local union members to vote on ratifications even though not everyone will be
covered by the agreement). My point is that this is distinguishable from pooling.
32. Of course not all unions are going under, but union representation of nonagricultural employees
has now dropped to the mid-teens. Proportion of Union Members Declines to Low of 15.8 Percent, DAILY
LAB. REP. (BNA), No. 25, at B-3 (Feb. 9, 1993). Impressionistic evidence supports reports of the death of
unions. Lawyers in law firm "labor departments" used to handle union-management cases. They lament the
passing of those times. Now they handle issues of discrimination, at-will employment, and ERISA, but not
labor-management. It is hard to find secondary boycott and jurisdictional dispute cases in the current
reporters. The unions are too weak. Law schools, among the slowest to adapt to changes in the practice,
are beginning to offer "employment law" courses which, I contend, will soon push the traditional labor law
course into the "specialty" category, along with Roman Law. Even some labor law professors are moving
to new fields. See PAUL C. WEILER & GARY R. ROBERTS, THE LAW AND SPORTS (forthcoming 1993).
33. See supra note 3.
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